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JUL 2 5 2011 
case No 1nst.~~ 
Aled ___ AM X?.l_P.~' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE. LLC, 
PJainti1fs/Counterdefendants, 
v. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defcndant/Counterclaimant 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO CITY'S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiff's, by and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane, LLP, and pursuant co Rule 
54( e)( 6) of the ldaho RuJes of Civil Procedure. submit their Memorandum in Oppositiort to City'~· 
Memorandum ofCosls and Auorneys Fees with Sraremeflt ifl Support, and ask the Court to enter an 
order disallowing attorney fees in their entirety. 
I. f1iTRODUCl10N 
The City of McCaJl (''City') seeks an award of attorney fees in the amount of $82,023.00 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code sections 12·117 and 12·121. The City is not 
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seeking an award of costs, as a matter of right or discretionary. For the reasons set fonh below, the 
City is not entitled to an award of attorney fees in this matter. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Applicable Legal Staadard Vader Idaho Code Seetioas ll-117 or ll-121. 
While Plaintiffs will not concede the City is entitled to attorney fees in this matter. Plaintiffs 
will eoncedc the City's position that the applicable standard for whether an award of attorney fees is 
warranted in this case, either under Idaho Code section I 2·1 l 7 (applicable to proceedings involving 
government entities) or section 12-121, is functionally equivalent 
Only the prevailinG party is entitled to attorney fees. l.C. §§ 12-117(1); 12-121. The 
prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 12-117 only if the non-
prcvaHing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, which is similar to or the same as the 
standard under section 12-121 (in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54), which allows 
an awatd of attorney fees only when the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously. 
unreasonably or without foundation. Tgtal Success lnvs . ._LLC v. Ada County HiaiJwu: Dist., 148 
Idaho 688.676,227 P.3d 942,950 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Narion v. Degt. ofCorrccctioos, 144 Idaho 
177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007)). An action is not pursued frivolously or without foundation 
merely because the party opposinG a request for attorney fees lost on an issue before the court. See 
Low~ry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Likewise, a mispcrception of one·s rights under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct Td. 
Rather, the position adopted by the non-prevailing party must be so plainly fallacious that it could be 
deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. ld. 
In this case the City bas not, and cannot, establish that the claims pursued and positions 
adopted by Plaintiffs in this case were so plainly fallacious so as to rise to the level of :frivolous. 
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unreasonable or without foundation. Therefore, the City is not entitled to an award of its anomey 
fees in this matter. 
B. Tbe City bas not Established that it is the Pnvailiag Party. 
From the outset. the City's motion for attorney fees is premature. Plaintiff's' Motion for 
Reconsideration is pendins before this Court and is set for hearing. In that motion. Plaintiffs assert 
that issues and claims remain unresolved in this matter. If Plaintiffs' motion is granted, the City 
cannot be the prevailing party. Further, the City threatens in its motion for attorney fees that if if 
fails in its efforts to win attorney fees under sections 12-117 or 12·121. it will seek to establish a 
factual basis for the breach of contract claim asserted in its counterclaim against Plaintiffs, and 
request attorney fees pursuant to that claim. The cowtterclaim remains pending and unresolved, and 
there js no evidence in the record this point in time to even suggest the City may prevail on that 
claim. Since there are unresolved issues in this matter, the City cannot claim prevailing party status. 
Since the City cannot establish that it is the prevailing party, it is not entitled to an award ofanomey 
fees under Idaho Code section 12-117 or 12·121. 
C. Tile Cil)' is not Entitled to Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code Sectioa 12-ll? or 
12-121. 
As set fonh below, Plaintiffs pursued their claims against the City in good faith, and witb a 
reasonable basis in tact and in existing Idaho law. Therefore. an award of attorney fees to the City is 
not warranted whether under Idaho Code section 12-117 or section 12-121. 
1. The District Court's decision in Buckskin tt. 111. v. Valin Coua!y, Cast 
No. CV-l009-S54-C supported Pbbatiffs positioa ia tllis case regardiag 
the i.uue of the four ytar statute of limitatioiU. 
This Court is well acquainted witb the action bctween Buckskin Properties, Inc. et. Q/. v. 
Valley County. For the Court's convenience, the Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment (''Memorandum Oecisionu) jn that case is attached as Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Victor V ilfegas. In BuS<.~ this Coun fixed the da1e at which the swute oflimitations 
began to run at the time Buckskin dedicated right of way to Valley County of its property; 
At the very la~ drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs.. October 24, 
2005 was the date when the statute oflimitations beeaz, to nm. This was the date the 
when the dedication of right of way was a<:cepted and it was the point in time at 
which the impainnent of such a degree and l<in<l as to constitute a substantial 
interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent 
~Memorandum Decision, p. S.) In Bw;lcskin Valley County argued that the statuteoflirnitations 
began running at the issuance of a conditional use pennir and/or the date the parties sicned a Road 
Development Agreement. This Court rejected that position and found that. under the standards set 
tbnb in Iibbs v. Cjty of Sandvoint, I 00 Idaho 667. 603 P .2d 1001 (1979), the taking became 
"apparent" at the time the plaintiffs in Buckskin dedicated right of way to VaJJey County. ~ 
Memorandum Decision, p.S.) In other words, it was upon the actual conveyance of property to 
Valley County by the plaintiffs in Buck!lkio that the taking became apparent for purposes of accrual 
of the statute of limitation. 
The Court• s decisi011 in the Dudcskin, if anythin" encouraged Plaintiffs in this case. It was 
very clear under the undisputed facts of this case that Plaintiffs conveyed deeds to the lots at issue 
within the four year statute of limitations period. With all due respect to the Coun' s decision in this 
case regarding the accrual of the statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation case, it is 
inconsistent with this Court's decision in Buckski1J. There is no functional difference between the 
Development Agreement Plaintiffs signed in this case and the Road Development Agreement the 
plaintiffs signed in Buckskin. Under the Tibbs and McCu~key v. Canyon Cnty Comm'rs, l281daho 
213, 912 P.2d JOO (1996) line of cases, when a taking becomes .. apparent" is a factual question. 
These cases do not establish a bright line rule as to a time or event that constitutes the taking. 
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Plaintiffs maintain that their loss could not have become .. apparcrn" in this case until they actually 
conveyed title to the nine lots at issue. 
Plaintiffs position. at very least, is ~nsistent with this Court's determination in Bucbkio that 
a claim for inverse condemnation accrued upon the dedication of a right of way to Valley County. It 
was the conveyance of property that made the taking "'apparent". not the signing of an agreement 
~Memorandum Decision, p. S.) Plaintiffs entered this case with reliance, in part, on this Court's 
decision in B~kskin. In this case no substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property occurred, 
or could have occurred. until conveyance of the lots ar issue. Indeed, Plaintiffs could have ~lined 
to continue on with their development after signing the Development Agreement in this case and 
before tbe nine lots were ~nveycd, and there would have been no taking. If anything, the Buckslsin 
decision indicated a favorable outcome in this case based Ofl the four year statute of limitations. 
l. PJabatiff's pursued t•eir claina• 011 a good faith ba&W under uistme 
prcecdut a•d c:oatro1Jia11aw. 
(•) Four Year Statate of Limitation.s. 
In addition to the arguments made above with regard to the Buckskin case and in relation to 
the four year statute of limitation for inverse condemnation claims, Plaintiffs made good faith 
arguments under existinc Idaho case law as to when the four year statute of limitations accrued in 
thistase. The City assertsthatunderMcCu~kexii ( McCyskeyv. CanvonCnty~m•rs, 128Idaho 
213. 912 P.2d 100 (1996)) that this Court must award the City attorney fees bec:ause the 
~ovemmentaJ entity (Canyon County) was awarded its attorney fees in that MCuskg JI. The facts of 
this case with regard to the awarding of attorney fees are distinguishable from the facts ofMxQJ!Ikg' 
II and the circumstances under which attorney fees were awarded in that case. In McCuske,y II the 
plaintiff made an argument for a change in the law and incorporation of the "continuing tort'' 
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analysis fo~ Farber v. Sytg. Jl)~ Jdaho 398. 630 P.2d 685 (1981) into the analysis of accrual of an 
inverse condemnation case. See McCvskg:v. Canyon CntyQnnm'rs. 128Idaho213, 218,912 P.ld 
100~ lOS (1996). This would have been a deviation from the established McCuskey and~ 
standard of "apparentness" and would have created an ongoing acaua.l period. 
The Idaho Supreme Coun in McCusk~ ll awarded anorney fees because it determined that 
the plaintiff's argument for a change in the law was frivolous in light of existinc precedent 
Specifically, the Ms;Cuskey fi Court determined that the application of the "continuing tort'~ concept 
to the accrual analysis in inverse condemnation claims had already been implicitly rejected under the 
case Intermountain West. Tnc. v. Boise City. 111 Idaho 818. 728 P.2d 767 (J 986). Unlike in 
McCusk~ II. Plaintiffs here made no argument for a change in the .. apparentness" standard under 
Tibbs or McCuskex II. When a taking became apparent is a factual question. Plaintiffs' argwnc:nt 
thac a taking could not have been apparent in this matter until conveyance of the Jots to the City 
because no substantial interferente witb their property rights oc:eurred before that time was made in 
good faith, particularly in light of this Court's decision in the Buckskin case. 
(b) Idaho Tort Claim Act. 
Plajntiffs pursued claims under state law on a good faith basis. The City asserts that 
Plaintiffs were without any reasonable basis to pursue these claims because tlle Idaho Tort Claims 
created a complete defense and because Plaintiffs' assenion of equitable estoppel with reprd to the 
Idabo Ton Claims Act was inappropriate and because Plaintiffs' "mislead" this Coun as to the 
applicable clements of a claim of equitable estoppel. 
The City paints a completeJy inaccurate picture of Plaintiffs' state based claims. With regard 
to the City's defense asscncd under the Idaho Tort Claims Act~ it is clear that Plaintiffs' argued on 
summary judgment that the City created a new claim and a new J 80-day limitations period to recover 
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affordable housing fees by enacting an ordinance to repay such fees to 1he developers that paid them. 
Plaintiffs arsued that a new claim was created by the City's ac:tion. The City had no obligation to 
enact an ordinance to repay affordable housing fees simply because its ordinance was found to be 
illegal. The Idaho Tort Claims act would have created a complete defense for the City against most 
developers that paid the fees. Nonetheless, the City opted to create a new right to claim fees by 
enacting an ordinance to repay the illegally extracted fees. Plaintiffs' argument that a new 
limitations period under the Idaho Tort Claims Act was reasonable based on the fact that the City 
created a new ordinance and~ thus, a new time period, to claim a right to repayment of the illegal 
fees. This is an issue of first impression~ there are no Idaho appellate court decisions addressing the 
issue of the creation of a new claim when a City passes an ordinance to repay illegally extracted fees 
from developers. 
Moreover. Plaintiffs reliance on quasi estoppel in their briefing as a defense to the one 
hundred eighty ( 180) day limitations period under the Idaho Tort Claim A~ docs is not frivolous. 1 
Although this Court found that Plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the City gained an advantage by 
taking inconsistent positions, quasi estoppel is applicable now in the context of analyzing attorney 
fees. The City used the Tort Claims Act as a shield against Plaintiffs· state based claims and now 
attempt to use it as a sword to collect attorney fees. Plaintiffs were induced to change their position 
and complete and submit a claims form based on the Cityt s ordinance to pay back the illegal exaction 
in the fonn of affordable housing fees. The City created the tlaim by passing an ordinance and now 
takes an inconsistent position by arguing it was frivolous for Plaintiff's in this case to do so and 
1 The elements o( quasi estoppel include: "(I} lbe ofkm!ing ptU1'Y took a differeftt position than hi• or her origillil 
position. and (2) either {a) tbe otrcnding party gained an advantage or cnused a disadvantage tO the odler party; (b) the 
other pany was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to pmnit the offending party to maintain 
an inCOfiSisrcnt position front one he or she has already derived a bcnctit or acqu~d in." M9rtcnJO!! v ..SWW!!rt Guar, 
Title~. 149 Idaho 4)7. 235 P.3d 387 (lOIO)(quofinaTmazau. Blni!!(CO!i!!!!¥. J471daho l93, 200n. J, 207 P.3d 
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pursue state-based claims in this action. This, in and of itself: creates . the inducement or is 
unconscionable to the degree that it should prevent an award of attorney fees in this case. 
In summary, the fact that Plaintiffs' state claims were held to be barred by the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act is not a sufficient basis to fmd that Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. Plaintiffs made a 
good faith !eaal argument that the City created a new claim for recovery of affordable housing fees 
based on the City's enacting of an ordinance to repay fees. The question of whether a City can create 
a new claim and a new limitations period under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is not an issue that the 
Idaho Supreme Coun has addressed. Nonetheless, it was a good faith art;ument and the City should 
not be entitled to attorney fees based on Plaintiffs' state .. bascd claims. 
(c) .KMST. 
With reg.atd to the issue of voluntariness and exhaustion, Idaho precedent in KMST. LLC v. 
~ountv of Ada. t 38 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) does notcompeJ an award ofattomeyfees 
to the City either. The City claims that because Plaintiffs signed the Development Agreement, which 
required them to convey the nine Jots at issue. their actions were voluntary and they should have 
known their claims were barred. Moreover. the City asserts that Plaintiffs acted voluntarily in the 
sense of KMST because they did not object upon entering into the Development Agreement. (See 
City· s Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.) This does not compel the result 
urged by the City with regard to an award of attorney fees. KMST does not stand for this proposition 
as asserted by the City. Nowhere in any holdins in KMSI does the Idaho Supreme Coun state that 
not objecting to a Development A;reement equates to a voluntary action. A development agreement 
was not at issue in KMST. the plaintiffs in that case included the condition that they later objected to 
in their own application. Additionally, Plaintiffs' pending Motion to Reconsider directly bears on 
169. !16 n. 3 (l009)). 
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the issue of involuntariness and the good faith basis under which Plaintiffs p\U'Sued their claims. 
Furthermore, the facts of this case on the issue of voluntariness are distinguishable from 
KMST: 
• There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs susgested or recommended conveying 
the lots to the City. The City's Planning and Zoning Commission asked Plaintiffs about 
community bousin~ but that hardly equates to Plaintiffs volunteerinG to pay such fees or 
conveying lots in Ueu of paying a fee. The comments to that effect were prepared by the City 
and included in the City's own reports. In KMST it was the developer who actually 
volunteered to build a road and dedicate it in the developer's land usc application after bcing 
told it would be recommended as a condition to approval. 
• The October 19, 2006, Memorandum from Steven Hasson to McCall City Staff with regard 
to affordable housing fees and issuance of building pennits, which comes to Jight in 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Re<:ans1deration. demonstrates that the City bas a much different 
definition of"voluntary". No such internal policy existed in KMST. 
• Resolution 05-19, adopted by the City on September 22, 200S, was a policy on the: issue of 
affordable housing the pre-existed Plaintiffs' appHcarion. No such resolution or written 
policy existed in KM[[. 
• Plaintiffs' expert Gerry Annstrong, disclosed in Plaintiffs Designation ofExpcrt Witnesses. 
filed with the Court on Apri14, 2011 ~ will provide testimony that that land use applicants are 
strongly persuaded by planning staff'. if not outright required. to agree to conditions that the 
applicant did not expect nor want to ~ to. Mr. Armstrong will also testify that the 
developer of Greystone Village was more likely than not required to provide for community 
housing. 
Plaintiffs' conveyance of the nine Jots in this case was not voluntary. The evidence in the record on 
this question clearly demonstrates that Plaintiffs, in good faith, argued that their actions were 
involuntary or were otherwise compelled by the City. The holding ofKMST. contrary to the City's 
position, does not suggest otherwise. The facts of~ and the voluntary offer by the plaintiff in 
that case to build a road and dedicate it to Ada County in that case is distinguishable from the facts of 
this case. The result in KM.ll does not warTant an award of attorney fees in this case. 
(d) Two Year Statute ofLimitatioas. 
With regard to the two year statute ofJirnitations, the City simply claims that Plaintiffs acted 
frivolously in light of Ninth Circuit PJ'e(edent. This utterly ignores the basis of Plaintiffs' claims 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATIORNEY 
FEES· 9 
606 
2011-07-25 15:35 veane LLP 208 345 3514 208 634 8262 p 11/18 
under the federal constitution for inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs made: a· claim for inverse 
condemnation directly under the Fifth Amendment. On this question, this Court is not bound by 
Ninth Circuit precedent. but rather is bound by the statements of the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
Idaho Supreme Court reeogruzed a dirctt claim under the Fifth Amendment in BHA Investments, 
Inc. v. {;jtyofBoise, 141Idaho 168. 176 n.2. I 08 P.3d 315,323 n.2 (2004): "(t]he Takings Clause is 
self-executin~ and a takings claim may be based solely upon it .. ". Tile Idaho Supreme Court views 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as self executing and that inverse condemnation 
claimants may proceed in Idaho courts directly under the Fifth Amendment (or as a Section 1938 
claim). ld. Plaintiffs' pursuit ofits federal claims was not frivolous, but rather was in-line with the 
senJcd decision of the Idaho Supreme Court case. 
(e) Williamson County. 
TI1e ripeness tests of Williamsgn C<'unty Reg 'I Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of 
Jphnson Qtt. 473 U.S. l72 (1985) also do not justify an award of attorney fees to the City. The City 
argues that under Williamson County Plaintiffs' federal inverse condemnation claim should not have 
been presented until "they have first pursued and lost an inverse condemnation claim based on state 
remedies."' (See City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Supporting Statement p. 9.) 
The City. however, misinterprets the WUJiamson County holding. 
One of the William;wn Count! ripeness tests prevents inverse condemnation claims based on 
the federal constitution to be brought first in federal courts if such an action can be maintained in a 
state court ~ .Ylilliamson County ReS,:! Ptanuins Commission. 473 U.S. at 186-87. However, 
there is nothing in the Williamson County decision that prevents a party from brin.:ing an inverse 
condemnation claim based on both state and federal constitutions simultaneously in state court. 
Since state courts have concurrcnc jurisdiction to hear federal claims it would make no sense to wait 
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to be denied on stacc law grounds before seeking reliefunder federal law. In fact, the WUJiarnson 
~decision docs not stand for that proposition. Such a holding would frustrate a parties' ability 
to timely bring federally protected claims if it had to wait to be denied on its state based claims. 
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim was properly brought in state coun. Thus, Plaintiffs' actions 
are not frivolous aJ1d attorney fees are not warranted under the holding of Williamson County as the 
City su"ests. 
D. The Attorney Fees aaimed by the City were DOt Reasonably mcurred. 
1. The Attorneys Fees sought by the City are oc:essivc ia Ught or the 
prevailiDI c:harget for like work factor aader Rule 54( e). 
Even assuming that the City can establish that Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or in the law, the attorney fees award sought by the City is exce$$ive and should be disallowed. 
The attorney fees requested by the City must be reasonable and any decision with regard to awarding 
fees must consider the factors identified in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(eX3). These factors 
include. amonQ others, the prevailing charges for like work. I.R.C.P. S4(eX3XD). The hourly rate 
charged by City's counsel is excessive under the applicable standards for assessing the 
reasonableness of the fee sought and prevailing charges for like work. As a result, City's request for 
attorney fees should be disallowed or significantly reduced. 
In considering the prevailing charges. this Court should consider the relevant geo1$f8phic area, 
nor the prevailing rate charged by a particular segment of the legal community. Lettunisb v. 
Lettunich, J4lldaho 425, 435, l J I P.3d l 10, !20 (2005). More specifically, "{iJn detennining the 
reasonableness of an hourly rate, the court should consider the 'prevailing charges' in a geographic 
context rather than in a strata context That is, the coun should consider the fee rates generally 
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prevai1ing in the pertinent geographic area~ rather than what any particular segment of the legal 
community may be charging.'" ld. 
In requesting attomey fees, me City asks this Court to specifically ignore the pertinent 
"geo~phic an:a,. and the '"prevailing rate" standard pn:scribed by the Idaho Supreme Court is 
assessing the reasonableness of the fees sought by the City. The City's lead counsel, Mr. Meyer, 
indicates in paragraph 12 of his affidavit that his hourly rate charged in this matter was $305 per hour 
in 2010 and $310 per hour in 2011, after a reduction in his usual rate as an accommodation to the 
City. Mr. Hendrickson, Mr. Meyer's partner. states jn paragraph 8 ofhis affidavit that his hourly rate 
in this matter was $200 per hour in 2010 and S21 0 per hour in 201 1. Mr. Hendrickson does state in 
paragraph 10 of his affidavit that the fees chatt;cd by him and his firm are at or below the prevailins 
charges for like work in McCall, Idaho, but provides no basis for or infonnation to substantiate his 
claim. 
To support the rates charged to the City. the City offers the affidavit of Mr. WiUiam F. 
Nichols, the City's regular legal counsel. Mr. Nichols states in his affidavit that, due to the stakes 
involved in this litigation and the City's financial situation, it was necessary to look outside of 
McCall for legal counsel. Mr. Nichols direeted the Chy to hire Mr. Meyer based on Mr. Meyer's 
exlensivc experience with litigating inclusionary zoning and affordable housing matters. Mr. 
Nichols acknowledges in his affidavit that chis case involved fairly straightforward matters of law. 
but also states that the ease involved complex and sophisticated matters offederaJ law and, because 
Mr. Meyer hed already litigated the same or similar issues on behalf of Valley County, it made sense 
for the City to retain Mr. Meyer. None of Mr. NichoFs statements suppon a finding that the rates 
charged by the City's counsel are similar to the prevailing rates charged in the geographic area. 
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Mr. Nichols does state in paragraph 8 of his affidavit that that it is his experience that 
attorneys in the Boise area would likely charge between $200 to $400 per hour for like work. Jn 
paragraph 10 ofhls affidavit, Mr. Nichols also states that he would charge clients similar rates in 
similar matters and that the rates charged by the City's counsel in this case reflect '•market" rates. 
What Mr. Nichols docs not state in his affidavit is the rate he charges the City for his !esal services, 
which is within his direct knowledge and which would be a much more accurate metric for the Idaho 
Supreme Court's standard in Lsttunich. The City has obviously hired attorneys located in McCall for 
legal services, as stated in Mr. Nichols' affidavit, yet there is nothing in the record reflecting what 
those attorneys actually located in McCan charge the City when it retains local attorneys for legal 
worlc. This also would be a much more accurate indication of the prevailing rate in the geographic 
area. Mr. NichoJs instead testifies about th~ prevailing rate in Boise. 
In further support of the fees claimed, the City provides the affidavit ofMurray D. Feldman, a 
partner at the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Han. Mr. Feldman states in paragraph 10 of 
his affidavil that"[ f]or these proceedings. lawyers in the Boise, Idaho market generally charee hourly 
rates between S 180 and S450. During the time period in 2009 and 2010 when this case was litigated. 
my billing rates for this type oflitigation were in the range of$335 to $425 per hour." Mr. Feldman 
makes no mention of the rates typically charged in the McCall market. 
Mr. Feldman· s affidavit provides no additional support that the City's claim for attorney fees 
is in line with the prevailing rate for the ~eo graphic area. While Mr. Feldman may charse his clients 
$335 to $425 ~ hour, this is not proper evidence of the prevailing charges for the relevant 
geographic:: area under Rule 54(c)(3) or the Idaho Supreme Court's directive in Lettunich. Rather, 
the City is asking for attorney fees based on rates charged by the largest furns in Idaho. According to 
the website of Mr. Feldman's finn (www.hollandhart.com), Holland & Hart is a 400 attorney law 
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finn and its Boise office alone is significantly larger than most law firms in Idaho. Basing the hourly 
rate charged on what an attorney at one of the largest finns in the western United States charges is 
specifically prohibited under Lettuni~h. Lettunich, at 435, 111 P.Jd at 120 (" ... the court should 
consider the fee rates generally prcvaHing in the pertinent geographic area. rather than what any 
particular segment ofthc legal community may be charging".) 
2. The Attorneys Fees sought by the City are excessive ill Iicht of the prevailiag 
time a ad labor and the aovelty a ad difficulty of the question factors uader Rule 
54( e). 
In addition to the prevailing charges for like work factor, 1he City's request for attorney fees 
should also fail under the factors addressing the time and labor required and the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions. ~ l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3){A), (B). As the City asserts on page 8 of its 
Memorandwn of Costs and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement wherein the City: "lt]hcre was 
no novel question of law. There were no unusual facts. This was a. textbook statute oflimitations 
case controlled by Tibbs, McCuskey II, and other settled authority." Y d, on the other hand, the City 
claims that it is owed an excessive amount of attorney fees due to the complexity of the issues 
involved. As set forth in the affidavirs of Mr. Nichols, Mr. Meyer, Mr. Hendrickson and Mr. 
Feldman. each mention the complexity of the lecal issues involved in this case. 
In even further support of the claim for attorney fees. Mr. Meyer references his cases in 
Blaine County addressing illegal in<::lusionary zoning ordinances and attaches thc:judce's award of 
attorney fees in that ease to justify the fees charged in this case. ~Meyer Affidavit, Ex. C.) What 
Mr. Meyer was awarded in the Blaine County and Ketchum cases is irrelevant to this case. Those 
cases may have involved complex questions oflaw concerning incJusionary housing. For the Court's 
convenience, the decisions in Mr. Meyer's cases in Blaine County and Ketchum are attached to the 
Affidavit of Victor Villegas as Exhibit B. 
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The fact of the matter is that, in this taSe, the legality ofinclusionary housing practices is not 
an issue. It is an adjudi~tcd fact that McCaW s inclusionary housing ordinance was illegal per Judge 
Neville's decision in Mountain Central Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 
2006-490-C. (See Exhibit U to the Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt, on file with the Court.) That 
was never an issue in this case. The only issue argued thus far in this case by the City is the statute 
of limitations. As Mr. Nichols states in parasraph 7 of his affidavit: " ... the statute ofliln.itations and 
lack ofnotic:e issue were relatively straightforward ... ". As stated above, the City makes this same 
assertion in its briefmg supporting its claim for attorney fees. The novelty and difficulty of the issues 
in this case, contrary to the assertions made by Mr. Nichols, Mr. Meyer and Mr. Hendrickson in their 
affidavits, do not wanant the amount of fees sought by the City. 
J. Tbe amout of fees soagbt by the City is excusivt in light or the preexisting 
work conducted on the same issues involved in this case. 
Plaintiffs also call into question the amount offees ~laimcd by the City in this matter based 
on work performed by the City's <;aunsel prior to this case in the Buckskin matter, As set forth in 
Mr. Meyer's affidavit. both Mr. Meyers and his partner Mr. Hendrickson represented Valley County 
in the Buckskin case aeajnst Valley County, which involved similar issues. Mr. Nichols~ affidavit 
states that the City hired Mr. Meyer and his finn because of his involvement in Buckslsin and the 
Road Development Agreements at issue in that case. lndeed, this is reflected in the motion for 
summary judgment filed by the City in this case. Many parts of the City's motion for summary 
judgment briefing arc similar to the sw:runary judgment briefValley County filed in Buckskin. Some 
parts ofthe City's brief is a verbatim copy ofthe B~kskin bricfmg For the Courfs convenience. the 
swnmary judgment brief tiled by Mr. Meyer and Mr. Hendrickson in the Buckskin case is attached as 
Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Victor VilJcgas. 
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Barely any written diseovtry was conducted in this case and no depositions were taken. Yet, 
in this c:nse Mr. Meyer and Mr. Hendrickson charged the City almost $25,000.00 more than they 
charged to Valley County in the Bud<.skin case while the rates they charged to the City were 
neglieibly more. Given the issues actually at play in this case and the time and labor required, 
particularly in light of the fact that the City's counsel litigated similar issues just a few months prior 
and their briefing reflects that fact, the time and labor claimed by the City•s attorney and the resulting 
fees in this matter is unreasonable. 
While the City may exercise its discretion in hiring the legal counsel of its choice, it is not 
entitled to claim an award of attorney fees in an extreme excess of the prevailing geographical rate 
for attorneys in the McCall. Idaho area. The novelty of the issues at play in this case and the time 
and labor required also do not support the fees claimed by the city. Since the City has failed to 
establish that its attorney fees are 1n·line with the prevailing charges for the geographic area and 
because the City's fees are excessive in light of the issues involved and the time and labor necessary! 
the City's request for attorney fees should be disallowed or significantly reduced. 
IU. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Cowt decline to grant an award 
to the City for any attorney fees in this matter. 
DATED this 25111 day of July, 201 J. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
sy r~r~ 
Victor ViUC ~the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CER11FY that on this 25th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing doeument was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid. and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by ovemight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise~ 10 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388·1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Auorneysfor Defondant 
[XJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
f ] Hand Delivery 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 446\ 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83 701-2720 
Office: 208-3 88-1200 
Fax: 208-388-1300 
chrismcyer@givenspursley .com 
mch@gi venspursley .com 
Case No. lnst. No. 
Filed /0: .j(,e_ A.M. ---
----PM. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City of McCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
Case 'No: CV 2010-276C 
STIPULATION TO MOVE HEARING ON 
PENDING MOTJONS FROM VALLEY 
COUNTY TO ADA COU~TY 
ST!PliLATION TO MOVE HEARING ON PF:I\DING MOTIONS FROM VALLEY COUNTY TO ADA COUNTY Page I 
615 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC, and the 
Defendant, City of McCall. by and through their respective attorneys of record, and hereby 
stipulate and agree that the hearing on pending motions that is currently scheduled for September 
I. 2011, in Valley County before Judge Michael R. McLaughlin shall be heard in Ada County, at 
a date and time to be determined by the Court. 
DATED this _!_f_ day of August, 20 II. 
EVANS KEANE, LLP 
i '-t:· I /'/ By: / c-</ 1 / c.l...~y.#J 
Victor S. Villegas~0 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
{!_ 
DATED this .li day of August, 20 II. 
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CERT~ATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the il day of August. 20 ll, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 8370 J -0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vv i llegas@evanskeane.com 
0 
0 
0 ~ 0 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB# 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB# 5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP CaseNo. ___ \nslNo'-......--
Filed A.M. 4:: tt4 ?.M 60l West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: 208-388-1200 
Fax: 208-388-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspursley .com 
mch@givenspursley .com 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterc/aimant City of McCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
CITY'S RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION TO 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 11,2011, Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofMcCall ("City"), submitted 
City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement ("Fees 
Memorandum"). This is the City's response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to City's 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees ("Opposition") dated July 25, 2011. 
ARGUMENT 
J. THE BUCKSKIN DECISION DOES NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFFS' POSITION. 
The City pointed to this Court's decision in Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, 
Case No. CV-2009-554C (Jan. 7, 2011) as a basis for awarding attorney fees. 1 In their 
Opposition, Plaintiffs contend that it actually supports them. To accomplish this, in a show of 
remarkable chutzpah, they misrepresent the Court's own decision. 
Plaintiffs accurately quote the following statement from the Buckskin decision: 
At the very least, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiff, October 25,2004 was the date when the statute of 
limitations began to run. This was the date when the dedication of 
right of way was accepted and it was at this point in time at which 
impairment of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial 
interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent. 
Buckskin decision at 5 (quoted in Opposition at 4). 
From this, Plaintiffs conclude that "this Court fixed the date at which the statute of 
limitations began to run at the time Buckskin dedicated right of way to Valley County of its 
property." That is not what the Court said. The Court said that the statute of limitations began to 
run from this day "[a]t the very least." In the immediately prior sentence, the Cou11 said: 
However, as Valley County points out, the "Plaintiffs certainty 
knew the essential facts on July 14, 2004, the day they received the 
1 In the City's fee request, we stated: "If Plaintiffs' counsel initially was entitled to a learning curve on the 
statute of limitations and other defenses, that cannot be said in the case at bar. The Court's decision in Buckskin on 
January 7, 20 !I should have been ample education for the Plaintiffs here." Fees Memorandum at 10. 
CITY'S RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION 'fO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
4432-4 /1223887 _3 
Page I 
ll.I003/0l7 
6/9 
09/08/2011 THU 15: 25 FAX 208 1300 Givens Pursley 
Conditional Use Permit and they signed the Capital Contribution 
Agreement setting out the contribution requirements in full." 
Buckskin decision at 5. Oddly, Plaintiffs did not mention this sentence in the Opposition. Only 
by overlooking this sentence, however, could Plaintiffs conclude: "Buckskin, if anything, 
encouraged Plaintiffs in this case." Opposition at 4. They say: "It was the conveyance of 
property that made the taking 'apparent', not the signing of an agreement" Opposition at 5. 
This is directly contradicted by the sentence from the Court's decision last quoted above. 
12JD04/017 
Plaintiffs admit: "There is no functional difference between the Development Agreement 
Plaintiffs signed in this case and the Road Development Agreement the plaintiffs signed in 
Buckskin." Opposition at 4. This is quite true. And that is why they the plaintiffs lost both 
cases. Plaintiffs' insistence that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in Buckskin tmtil 
the property was actually conveyed is simply not what this Court said and is inconsistent with the 
well-established law on the subject. Plaintiffs' refusal to take direction from this Court and to 
respect the precedents handed by the appellate courts justifies an award of attorney fees. 
II. THE MCCUSKEY II PRECEDENT CONTROLS TilE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD 
The City cited McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs ("McCuskey If'), 218 Idaho 213, 
912 P .2d 100 ( 1996) as precedent for an award of attorney fees against a plaintiff who ignores 
settled precedent on the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs distinguish McCuskey 11 because 
"[u]nlike in McCuskey II, Plaintiffs here made no argument for a change in the 'apparentness' 
standard under Tibbs or McCuskey II." Opposition at 6. That may be a distinction, but it is a 
distinction that makes their position even worse. At least the plaintiffs in McCuskey II 
recognized that the law was against them and sought a change in the law. The Greystone 
Plaintiffs have not even asked for a change in the law. Instead, they simply ask the Court to 
misapply or ignore clear precedent. As the Idaho Supreme Court said, attorney fees should be 
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awarded when the losing party ignores "a case that is almost directly on point with the facts in 
the instant action." McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P.2d at 105. Such is the case here. 
III. IDAHO TORT CLAIMS ACT 
Plaintiffs argue that they had a good faith basis to pursue their state law claims even 
though they failed to comply with fdaho Code§ 50-219 based on the theory that the City's act of 
allowing for refunds of fees paid under Ordinance 820 created a new limitations period. There is 
no need to rehash the merits of this issue. Whether analyzed under quasi-estoppel principles or 
something else, Plaintiffs cannot escape the fact that they did not pay any fees under Ordinance 
820, and therefore the City's decision to refunds fees paid pursuant to that Ordinance did not 
apply to them. Plaintiffs were never induced to change position and had no reasonable basis to 
believe that the City's decision to refund fees paid under Ordinance 820 would extend their time 
to submit a claim. Plaintiffs presented no case law or other authority that supported their 
argument. The standards for an award of fees under 12-117 is therefore met. 
IV. FEDERAL CLAIMS 
Again, the City will not repeat the arguments set forth in the prior briefing in this matter. 
It suffices to say that Plaintiffs presented no cogent argument and no authority in support of their 
claims based upon federal law. Even if the City were to concede that Plaintiffs may bring state 
and federal inverse condemnation claims together in state court, it does not help Plaintiffs to 
avoid the application of the two-year statute of limitations that applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Further, even ifthe City were to concede that there is a legitimate question over whether 
a plaintiff may bring a federal inverse condemnation claim directly under the Fifth Amendment, 
it still does not help these Plaintiffs because the two-year statute of limitations would apply 
anyway. See City's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 22-25. 
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V. THE FEES SOUGHT BY THE CITY WERE REASONABLY INCURRED 
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of attorney fees claimed by the City in this matter is 
excessive. Plaintiffs chal1enge both the hourly rate charged by the City's attorneys and the 
amount of time spent on the issues in this case. The City will address each issue in tum. 
A. Hourly rates. 
The Plaintiffs' objection to the hourly rates charged by the City's attorneys in this matter 
is based entirely on the notion that the City has not shown that such rates are consistent with the 
prevailing rates in the geographic area, citing Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 
P.3d 1 IO, 120 (2005). Plaintiffs conveniently ignore the Idaho Supreme Court's discussion of 
attorney's fees in Lettunich v. Lettunich ("Lettunich IF'), 145 Idaho 746,751, 185 P.3d 258,263 
(2008) (finding Boise counsel were properly retained "considering the complexity of this case 
and the time and resources that counsel would have to be able to devote to if'). The City has 
presented ample evidence showing that the City acted reasonably in retaining Givens Pursley for 
this action, and that the rates charged by the Givens Pursley attorneys in this matter were 
consistent with the prevailing charges for like work. 
B. Amount of time. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the number of hours spent on this matter by the City's 
attorneys was excessive based upon the issues presented and Givens Pursley's involvement in 
the Buckskin matter. 
As to the issues presented, while the City maintains that the notice of claim and statute of 
{imitations grounds upon which Plaintiffs' state Iaw claims were disposed are relatively simple 
matters that are controlled by existing precedent, that did not stop Plaintiffs from expending a 
tremendous amount of time and effort in their attempts to obfuscate or circumvent them. 
FUtther, even though the City knew from the very beginning of this case (and informed the 
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Plaintiffs) that these issues barred Plaintiffs' claims, the City acted prudently in retaining counsel 
with expertise in the underlying subject matter in case those issues were required to be 
addressed. 
Likewise, the legal precedents that barred the Plaintiffs' federal claims were well-
established, but required a significant amount of time and effort to address because of Plaintiffs' 
refusal to acknowledge the applicable legal authorities. 
While the statute of limitations and Williamson County issues in this matter were similar 
to the issues addressed in the Buckskin case, the other issues were different and therefore did not 
lend themselves to any efficiency. The notice of claim issue was not present at all in Buckskin. 
The KMST/voluntariness/exhaustion arguments were different in each case because of the factual 
nature of those arguments. Similarly, the analysis and presentation of the necessary factual 
record, including the extensive administrative history, required a great deal of time and effort 
that was not at all assisted by counsel's involvement in the Buckskin case. In fact, the 
administrative record and documentation was much more extensive in this case than in Buckskin. 
Furthermore, the City attempted to minimize the fees incurred in this matter but were 
rebuffed by Plaintiffs. Not only did the City attempt to end this case after it filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (See City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees with Supporting 
Statement, pp. 10-11), as set forth in the Second Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson filed 
contemporaneously herewith, the City requested that Plaintiffs agree to allow the City to defer 
responding to written discovery until after this Court could address the pending Motion for 
Summary Judgment. When the Plaintiffs rejected that request, the City was forced to complete 
its responses, which included the review and processing of more than 4,000 pages of documents. 
(The City respectfully disagrees with the Plaintiffs' representation that "Barely any written 
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discovery was conducted ... ") The additional expense incurred solely as a result of Plaintiffs' 
refusal to postpone those responses was more than $6,000. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' dogged pursuit of their claims in this case in the face of well established 
precedent meets the standard that triggers an award of attorney's fees under 12~ 117. Throughout 
this case, Plaintiffs have ignored applicable case law and the undisputable facts. The City 
respectfut1y submits that the Idaho Legislature enacted 12-117 to address cases just like this one 
and to deter such cases from being brought. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City requests that the Coutt deny Plaintiffs motion to 
disallow the fees and costs claimed by the City and to award the City the costs and attorney's 
fees that it reasonably incurred in the defense of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Respectfully submitted this 8111 day of September, 2011. 
.. ----~ 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP c 
By:~) 
Ma n G. I drickson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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State ofldaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. 1 make this 
Affidav1t based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief. 
2. I am a partner in the firm of Givens Pursley LLP which represents 
Defcndant/Counterclaimant City of McCall (the "City") in the above-captioned civil action. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a Jetter from Christopher 
Meyer to Victor Villegas dated April 23, 2011 that describes a telephone conversation that 
occurred on April22, 2011, between Mr. Meyer, Mr. Villegas, and me. Mr. Meyer's letter 
accurately summarizes the substance of that conversation. We did not receive any 
communication from Mr. Villegas claiming that the description ofthe conversation in Mr. 
Meyer's letter was inaccurate. 
4. As reflected in Mr. Meyer's April23, 2011, letter, we asked Mr. Villegas to grant 
the City an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests in order to avoid 
incurring additional expense while the Plaintiffs considered the settlement proposal set forth in 
Mr. Meyer's April IS, 2011, letter (Exhibit A to the City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees with Supporting Statement served July 11, 2011) and pending the Court's resolution of the 
City's Motionfor Summary Judgment that was scheduled to be heard on May 11, 201 I. Mr. 
Villegas refused to grant the request. 
5. Based upon the Plaintiffs' refusal to extend the deadline for the City's discovery 
responses for purposes of settlement negotiations and to await a decision on the pending motion 
for summary judgment, we were forced to complete the City's discovery responses and 
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processing of the City's documents that were requested by Plaintiffs. As reflected in Exhibit B 
to the Affidavit of Christopher H. Meyer dated July ll, 2011, the City incurred $900.00 in 
paralegal fees and $5,649.00 in attorney fees working on the responses to the Plaintiffs 
discovery requests, inc1uding reviewing and preparing documents for production, and the 
creation of a privilege log, between April25, 2011 and April28, 2011. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter from me that 
was hand delivered to Victor Villegas on April28, 2011, which provided him with copies of the 
identified documents and the privilege log. As reflected by the bates numbers of the documents, 
responding to the Plaintiffs' discovery requests to the City required the review and processing of 
nearly 4,500 pages of documents. As reflected in the record on file in this action, the City served 
its written responses to the Plaintiffs' diswvery requests on May 5, 2011. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 8" day of September, 2011. (--
Subscribed and SWOTll LO before me this 81h day of Septemb 
SECOND A)''FIJ)A VIT OF MARTIN C. HENI>ItiCKSON RE: ATfOUNEY FEJ<:S 
1246767 _, ( 4432-4 
Page 3 
f2)0l2/017 
628 
09/08/2011 THU l5t28 FAX 208 1300 Givens Pu~sley 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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1 Case No __ -..Jinst. No 
Ftled A.M. t '-:-.. IT"J' ... 7-P-.M 
t 2 
3 IN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
4 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
5 
6 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
7 VILLAGE, LLC, 
Case No. CV-2010-276C 
8 
9 
10 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, RECONSIDERATION 
(2) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
vs. A ITORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
11 CITY OF MCCALL, 
12 Oefendant/Counterclaimant. 
13 
14 APPEARANCES 
15 For Plaintiffs: VictorS. Villegas of Evans Keane, LLP 
16 For Defendant: Christopher H. Meyer of Givens Pursley, LLP 
17 
18 This matter came before the Court on (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
19 and (2} Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. After hearing oral argument, 
20 the Court took the matter under advisement 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
BACKGROUND 
This case arises from an application Plaintiffs made to the City for a planned unit 
development ("PUD") and subdivision in McCall called Greystone Village. Plaintiffs 
conveyed nine lots in Greystone Village to the City for community housing. The lots 
had a total value of $1,117,000.00 at the time of conveyance. The City claims that 
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2 
4 
Greystone itself proposed "donating" the lots and did, in fact. donate the lots to McCall 
because the City had no community housing requirement at the time Greystone 
submitted its application. 
The Plaintiffs filed applications for a subdivision and planned unit development 
5 
1
on January 12. 2005. At that time, the City had no community housing requirements. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
However, at the time of Greystone's application to the City for Greystone Village, the 
City had been studying the issue of affordable workforce housing. The City adopted 
Resolution 05-19 on September 22, 2005. The Resolution identifies the City's 
responsibility to assure the existence of affordable housing for the local workforce and 
that it was the City's responsibility under the Resolution to develop and implement a 
community housing policy to meet the affordable workforce housing need in McCall. 
The Resolution likewise directed City employees to develop ordinances to implement a 
community housing policy. 
Subsequent to the application by the Plaintiff for their planned unit development 
and subdivision, the City enacted Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 on February 23, 2006 
and those Ordinances were made effective as of March 9. 2006. The Ordinances 
required developers to contribute community housing units upon submitting a 
subdivision request and further required developers to pay a community housing fee at 
the time building permits were issued. 
The Plaintiffs' subdivision, because it had been filed before the enactment of the 
Ordinances, was grandfathered and not subject to the Ordinance; however, because 
24 the Plaintiffs had not actually obtained a building permit, at the time they requested 
25 building permits, Ordinance No. 820, which dealt with the fee for low income housing for 
26 
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3 
4 
building permits had been enacted and was applicable to the Plaintiffs. 
Despite the fact that the Plaintiffs' subdivision was grandfathered, the Plaintiffs 
did contribute nine lots within the subdivision, which is the Greystone Subdivision, to the 
City. The City agreed that the value of the lots would serve as a credit in the event any 
5 future community housing fees were to be assessed. The parties entered into a 
6 
i development agreement signed by the Plaintiffs on May 3, 2006. On February 19, 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
2008, Judge Neville, in a Memorandum Decision, invalidated Ordinance Nos. 819 and 
820, ruling that they were an invalid tax. Consequently, the Ordinances were repealed 
on April 24, 2008. As of that date, the City had accepted the lots from the Plaintiff and 
Greystone and had in fact constructed community housing and conveyed properties to 
qualified low income families and individuals. 
On June 16, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and determined that from the totality of the record 
before the Court, the dedication of the lots at issue was a voluntary action on the part of 
the Plaintiffs because no ordinances were in effect at the time of the Development 
Agreement that would have compelled the Plaintiffs to convey the lots. Based on the 
record before the Court, the Plaintiffs actually submitted the idea of the conveyance of 
• these lots for community housing to the City. The Court also found that Ordinance No. 
819 did not apply to the Plaintiffs because it had not been enacted until after they had 
filed for their SUB application. 
As pointed out in the application, there was specific language stating that "while 
the applicant is not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has 
agreed to deed the nine single family residential lots that constitute Phase 3 of the 
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project to the City of McCall to provide Community Housing." Furthermore, as pointed 
2 
out in KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003), voluntary actions do not 
3 give rise to takings. For those reasons, the Court found as a matter of law that the 
4 1 Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required. 
5 DISCUSSION 
6 . Motion to Reconsider 
7 A motion for reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment can be 
8 
made prior to entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P. 11(a}(2)(8); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 
9 
161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007}. A party may submit new evidence with the motion 
10 
11 
for reconsideration but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros. 143 Idaho 468, 
12 473. 147 P.3d 100, 105 {Ct. App. 2006). A decision to grant or deny a motion for 
13 reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Van v. Portneuf Med. 
14 Ctr .• 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). 
15 The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration for two main reasons. First, the 
16 Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum Decision issued by the Court on June 16, 2011, 
17 
did not dispose of all of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs because the Court did not 
18 
i address the Plaintiffs' claims for the costs associated with constructing roadway 
> 
19 
1 improvements and making utilities available. Second, the Plaintiffs argue that there are 
20 
21 
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs' voluntarily donated the nine 
22 lots at issue to the City of McCall because they submitted several Affidavits indicating 
23 that the transfer of the nine lots to the City of McCall was involuntary. 
24 The Defendant responds that the Plaintiffs' cfaims regarding roadway 
25 improvements and utilities are not actually separate claims because the Plaintiffs did 
26 
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not set those claims out separately in the First Amended Complaint, the Defendant 
2 
specifically sought dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims in its Motion for Summary 
3 ' Judgment, and the Plaintiffs have not previously suggested that there is a separate 
4 claim with respect to the utility work and other construction improvements. The 
s Defendant also responds that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
6 , voluntariness of the transfer of the nine lots because Ordinance No. 819 did not apply 
7 
8 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
to the Plaintiffs at the time they transferred the nine lots to the City of McCall. 
The Court agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs' claims regarding 
roadway improvements and utilities are not actually separate claims because the 
Plaintiffs did not set those claims out separately in the First Amended Complaint and 
the Defendant specifically sought dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court ruled as a matter of law on all of Plaintiffs' claims and 
any claims regarding roadway improvements and utilities were necessarily 
encompassed by the Court's ruling. 
Furthermore, the Court cannot find any reason to change its ruling on the issue 
of whether there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the voluntariness of the 
Plaintiffs' donation of the nine lots at issue to the City of McCalL Based on the Court's 
interpretation of the case law discussed in the Memorandum Decision that was issued 
on June 16, 2011, the dedication of the lots at issue was a voluntary action on the part 
of the Plaintiffs because no ordinances were in effect at the time of the Development 
Agreement that would have compelled the Plaintiffs to convey the lots. 
The Court understands that the Plaintiffs may have wanted to convey the lots 
because the City had indicated that the City had responsibility to assure the existence 
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of affordable housing for the local workforce and had indicated that it was the City's 
· responsibility to develop and implement a community housing policy to meet the 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I 
16 1 
,I 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
affordable workforce housing need in McCall. However, there was no ordinance in 
effect at that time that would have forced the Plaintiffs to convey the lots to the City. 
Therefore, the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
The Defendant argues that it is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs 
under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121. Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or 
political subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision 
or the court, as the case may be. shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees. witness fees and other reasonable expenses. 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or Jaw. 
I.C. § 12-117(1). 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides that: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal 
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's 
fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, 
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
I.C. § 12-121. 
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs pursued this case "without a reasonable 
basis 1n fact or law" and that the Plaintiffs pursued this case "frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation." The Defendant further argues that this is particularly true 
considering that the Plaintiffs continued to pursue this litigation following this Court's 
decision in Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC v. Valley 
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County, Valley County Case No. CV-2009-554-C. However, as was the case with 
2 
Buckskin, this litigation was not frivolously pursued considering the complex nature of 
3 
11 the legal issues involved in this case. 
4 This case presented a number of challenging legal issues regarding which 
5 statute of limitations applied, when the cause of action accrued, and whether the 
6 Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their remedies as set out in the case of KMST, LLC v. County 
7 
of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003). Although the Court ultimately ruled in the Defendant's 
8 
favor, the Court cannot say that the Plaintiffs pursued this case without a reasonable 
g 
basis in fact or law. Therefore. the Court will deny the Defendant's Motion for Attorney 
10 
Fees and Costs. 
12 CONCLUSION 
13 The Court (1) DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and (2) DENIES 
14 the Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
15 
16 
17 
OA TED this I ! dayof0ctober,2011. ~--
4iiELMcLAtJGHuN 
18 DISTRICT JUDGE 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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TI IIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to City of McCall's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and having granted City of McCall's Motion fiJr Summary Judgment in its 
Memorandum Decision on De fondant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on June 16, 
2011, and having considered the Afotionfor Reconsideration filed by the Plaintiti, and having 
considered the Afotionfor Attorney Fees and Costs filed by the Defendant, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision denying those motions on October 18, 2011; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on all 
counts of Plaint!ffs' First Amended Complaint; and 
2. That all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ~1_ day ofNovember~-----
1\/riCHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN 
District Court Judge 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in 
accordance with Rule 54(b ), I.R.C.P., that the Court has detennined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 21- day ofNovember, 2011. 
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to City of McCall's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and having granted City ojJ!cCall's Motion for Summary Judgment in its 
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on June 16, 
2011, and having considered the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Plaintiff, and having 
considered the Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs tiled by the Defendant, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision denying those motions on October 18, 20 ll; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on all 
counts of Plaint(ffs' First Amended Complaint; and 
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i1JCHAEL R. MCLAt;GHLIN 
District Court Judge 
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for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this -21.- day ofNovember, 2011. 
Jt:DGMENT 
4432-4_1197452_1 
~~a 
MICHAEL R. MCL GHLIN 
District Court Judge 
Page2 642 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of November, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the tollowing individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor ViUegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jrnanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.corn 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
chrisrneyer@gi venspursley .corn 
rnch@givenspursley .corn 
JUDGMENT 
4432-4_1197452_1 
~ 
0 
D 
D 
0 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
/U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
0 Express Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
0 Facsimile 
0 E-Mail 
ARCHIEN. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
Page 3 643 
Date: 1/26/2012 Fo icial District Court - Valley County User: THOMPSON 
Time: 02:39PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-2010-0000276-C Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Richard I. Hehr, etal. vs. City Of Mccall 
Richard I. Hehr, Greystone Village LLC vs. City Of Mccall 
Date Code User Judge 
7/15/2010 NCOC CGOODWIN New Case Filed - Other Claims Michael Mclaughlin 
CGOODWIN Filing: A- All initial civil case filings of any type not Michael Mclaughlin 
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Hehr, Richard I. (plaintiff) 
Receipt number: 0003558 Dated: 7/15/2010 
Amount $88.00 (Check) For: Hehr, Richard I. 
(plaintiff) 
APER CGOODWIN Plaintiff: Hehr, Richard I. Appearance Jed W. Michael Mclaughlin 
Manwaring 
APER CGOODWIN Plaintiff: Greystone Village Lie, Appearance Jed Michael Mclaughlin 
W. Manwaring 
COMP CGOODWIN Complaint Filed Michael Mclaughlin 
DOS I THOMPSON Summons: Document Service Issued: on Michael Mclaughlin 
7/15/201 0 to City of McCall; Assigned to Service 
Fee of $0.00 
7/16/2010 COMP PERRY First Amended Complaint Michael Mclaughlin 
7/28/2010 NOAP GARRISON Notice Of Appearance Michael Mclaughlin 
APER GARRISON Defendant: City Of Mccall Appearance William F Michael Mclaughlin 
Nichols 
8/30/2010 SUBC HON Notice of Substitution of Counsel Michael Mclaughlin 
8/31/2010 APER HON Defendant: City Of Mccall Appearance Michael Mclaughlin 
Christopher H. Meyer 
APER HON Defendant: City Of Mccall Appearance Martin C. Michael Mclaughlin 
Hendrickson 
9/1/2010 ANSW GARRISON Answer To 1st Amended Complaint & Michael Mclaughlin 
Counterclaim 
HRSC GARRISON Hearing Scheduled (Status 10/12/2010 04:00 Michael Mclaughlin 
PM) 
GARRISON Notice of Telephonic Status Conference Under Michael Mclaughlin 
I.R.C.P. 16(a) & 16(b) 
DOSS GARRISON Summons: Document Returned Served on Michael Mclaughlin 
6/29/2011 to City Of Mccall; Assigned to. Service 
Fee of $0.00. 
10/12/2010 DCHH PERRY Hearing result for Status held on 10/12/2010 Michael Mclaughlin 
04:00PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Not on record 
ORDR PERRY Scheduling Order For Trial and Further Michael Mclaughlin 
Proceedings 
HRSC PERRY Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/22/2011 Michael Mclaughlin 
09:00AM) 4 DAY COURT TRIAL 
HRSC PERRY Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Michael Mclaughlin 
08/03/2011 01:30 PM) 
REPL PERRY Reply To Counterclaim Michael Mclaughlin 644 
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Richard I. Hehr, etal. vs. City Of Mccall 
Richard I. Hehr, Greystone Village LLC vs. City Of Mccall 
Date Code User Judge 
11/24/2010 NOSV GARRISON Notice Of Service--1st Set of Discovery Requests Michael Mclaughlin 
to Ptfs/Counter/defs 
1/20/2011 NOSV GARRISON Notice Of Service--Ptfs/CounterDefs' Response Michael Mclaughlin 
to City's 1st Set of Discovery Requests to 
Ptfs/Counter/Defs 
4/4/2011 MISC GARRISON Ptfs Designation of Expert Witnsses Michael Mclaughlin 
4/5/2011 MOTN GARRISON City's Motion for Summary Judgment Michael Mclaughlin 
BREF GARRISON City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD GARRISON Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson Michael McLaughlin 
MOTN GARRISON Motion to Enlarge Page Limitation Michael McLaughlin 
4/6/2011 NOSV GARRISON Notice Of Service--Ptfs/Counterdefendants' 1st Michael McLaughlin 
Set of Discovery Requests to 
Def/Counterclaimant 
4/7/2011 AFFD GARRISON Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt (Separate File Michael McLaughlin 
Folder) 
4/11/2011 STIP THOMPSON Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery Michael McLaughlin 
Deadlines For The Expert Witness Disclosure 
Deadline 
4/12/2011 HRSC THOMPSON Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/11/2011 03:30 Michael McLaughlin 
PM) Tentative Set-Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
4/13/2011 NOTH GARRISON Notice Of Hearing Michael Mclaughlin 
4/27/2011 AFFD HON Affidavit of Bonnie Bertram Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD HON Affidavit of Jeffrey Beebe Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD HON Affidavit of Richard Hehr Michael Mclaughlin 
MEMO HON Memorandum Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD HON Affidavit of Dean W Briggs Michael McLaughlin 
MOTN HON Motion to Vacate Hearing and/or Allow Michael McLaughlin 
Supplemental Responses 
5/4/2011 REPL GARRISON City's Reply Brief in Support of Motion For Michael Mclaughlin 
Summary Judgment 
MOTN GARRISON Motion to Enlarge Page Limit for Reply Brief Michael Mclaughlin 
MEMO HON City's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Michael Mclaughlin 
Vacate Hearing 
5/5/2011 MOTN GARRISON Motion For Leave to Supplement Reply Brief & To Michael Mclaughlin 
Shorten Time 
NOSV HON Notice Of Service - Defendant/Counterclaimant's Michael Mclaughlin 
Answers to Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' First Set 
of Discovery Requests 
5/11/2011 MOTN THOMPSON Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Michael Mclaughlin 
Judgment Record and To Shorten Time 
645 AFFD THOMPSON Second Affidavit of Matthew C. Hendrickson Michael Mclaughlin 
Date: 1/26/2012 
Time: 02:39PM 
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Case: CV-2010-0000276-C Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Richard I. Hehr, etal. vs. City Of Mccall 
User: THOMPSON 
Richard I. Hehr. Greystone Village llC vs. City Of Mccall 
Date 
5/11/2011 
5/19/2011 
5/25/2011 
6/16/2011 
6/29/2011 
7/6/2011 
7/12/2011 
7/13/2011 
7/25/2011 
Code 
DCHH 
ADVS 
MEMO 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
BREF 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
HRVC 
HRVC 
AFFD 
HRSC 
AFFD 
MEMO 
User 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
KAY 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
GARRISON 
GARRISON 
GARRISON 
GARRISON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
GRIN DOl 
GRIN DOl 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Michael Mclaughlin 
held on 05/11/2011 03:30PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Summary Judgment 99 
minutes 
Scheduling Order For Trial & Further 
Proceedings 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Michael Mclaughlin 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Steven J Millemann Receipt number: 0002262 
Dated: 5/19/2011 Amount: $78.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Tape/CO Paid by: Michael Mclaughlin 
Steven Millemann Receipt number: 0002341 
Dated: 5/25/2011 Amount: $20.00 (Check) 
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Michael Mclaughlin 
Summary Judgment 
Motion For Reconsideration and Objection to 
Proposed Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion For 
Reconsideration 
Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support of Motion 
For Reconsideration 
City's Response Brief Opposing Motion for 
Consideration 
Affidavit of William F. Nichols 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson Michael Mclaughlin 
Affidavit of Christopher H. Meyer Michael Mclaughlin 
City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Michael Mclaughlin 
With Supporting Statement 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Michael Mclaughlin 
on 08/03/2011 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on Michael Mclaughlin 
08/22/2011 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 4 DAY 
COURT TRIAl 
Affidavit of Murray D. Feldman 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
09/01/2011 01:30PM) Reconsider Summary 
Judgment/Fees and Costs 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Notice of Hearing Michael Mclaughlin 
Affidavit Of Victor Villegas Michael Mclaughlin 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To City's Michael Mclaughlin 
Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees 646 
Date: 2/8/2012 
Time: 12:04 PM 
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Case: CV-2010-0000276-C Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Richard I. Hehr, eta!. vs. City Of Mccall 
User: THOMPSON 
Richard I. Hehr, Greystone Village LLC vs. City Of Mccall 
Date 
8/18/2011 
8/31/2011 
9/8/2011 
9/15/2011 
10/18/2011 
11/22/2011 
12/7/2011 
12/30/2011 
1/4/2012 
1/19/2012 
2/8/2012 
Code 
STIP 
ORDR 
HRVC 
HRSC 
RSPN 
AFFD 
DCHH 
MEMO 
JDMT 
STAT 
CD IS 
MISC 
NOTA 
BNDC 
STAT 
MISC 
NOTA 
TRAN 
User 
HON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
HON 
HON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
THOMPSON 
PERRY 
THOMPSON 
Judge 
Stipulation to Move hearing On Pending Motions Michael Mclaughlin 
From Valley County to Ada County 
Order Granting Stipulation to Move Hearing on 
Pending Motions From Valley County to Ada 
County 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Michael Mclaughlin 
on 09/01/2011 01:30PM: Hearing Vacated 
Reconsider Summary Judgment/Fees and Costs 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/15/2011 10:00 Michael Mclaughlin 
AM) Reconsider Summary Judgment/Fees and 
Costs 
City's Response to Opposition to Memorandum of Michael Mclaughlin 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Second Affidavit of Martin C Hendrickson RE: Michael Mclaughlin 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael Mclaughlin 
09/15/2011 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
Memorandum Decision (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Michael Mclaughlin 
Reconsideration (2) Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Judgment Michael Mclaughlin 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Michael Mclaughlin 
Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Mccall, Michael Mclaughlin 
Defendant; Greystone Village LLC, Plaintiff; 
Hehr, Richard 1., Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/22/2011 
Estimated Cost of Transcript Michael Mclaughlin 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Michael Mclaughlin 
Supreme Court Paid by: Greystone Village LLC, 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0000069 Dated: 
1/4/2012 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: 
Greystone Village LLC, (plaintiff) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Michael Mclaughlin 
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 70 Dated 1/4/2012 Michael Mclaughlin 
for 100.00) 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Notice of Cross Appeal 
Transcript Filed-Mia Martorelli 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Michael Mclaughlin 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Richard Hehr and Greystone 
Village, LLC. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant 
-vs-
City of McCall 
Defendant/Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39535-2012 
Case No. CV-2010-276C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION 
1 Affidavit of Michelle Groenvelt 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and aflixed the seal of the said 
Court this day of . 2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: ____________ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC., 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
-vs-
City of McCall, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39535-2012 
Dist. Court No. CV-2010-276C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Valley, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in 
this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and contains 
true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers 
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of 
Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any additional documents 
requested to be included. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the above entitled 
cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's 
Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
649 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of ' 2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
y 
650 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC ., 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
-vs-
City of McCall, 
Defendant/ Respondent, 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 39535-2012 
) 
) Dist. Court No. CV -201 0-276C 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________________________ ) 
I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe 
State ofidaho, in and for the County of Valley, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's 
Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Christopher Meyer 
Martin Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P. 0. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83 701-2 720 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
P. 0. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this day of '2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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